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BENDING IN THE BREEZE:
AMERICAN CLASS ACTIONS IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Richard Marcus*
The green reed which bends in the wind is stronger than the mighty
oak which breaks in a storm.
—Confucius
Going forward, the clear directive to plaintiffs seeking class certifica-
tion—in any type of case—is that they will face a rigorous analysis by
the federal courts, will not be afforded favorable presumptions from
the pleadings or otherwise and must be prepared to prove with
facts—and by a preponderance of the evidence—their compliance
with the requirements of Rule 23.1
—Judge Jane Boyle
It is always better to have the breeze at your back, but that surely
has not recently been the case for class action proponents.  At the risk
of overstating, there is a certain fin de siecle flavor to current procedu-
ral discussions, at least among academics; it seems that several foun-
dational principles of late twentieth century procedural ordering have
come under attack in the twenty-first century.  Although not alone
among those principles, class actions have a prominent role.  Dean
Robert Klonoff has recently written of “The Decline of Class Ac-
tions,”2 and Professor Linda Mullenix has written of “Ending Class
* Distinguished Professor of Law & Horace O. Coil Chair in Litigation, University of Cali-
fornia Hastings College of the Law.  This Article is based on comments during the 21st Annual
Clifford Symposium, which took place in April 2015, and only partly takes account of subse-
quent developments. Since 1996, I have served as Associate Reporter on the U.S. Judicial Con-
ference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, including work on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.  In this Article, I do not speak for the Committee or for anyone else.  Mary Kay Kane and
Bob Klonoff both offered numerous helpful comments on a draft of this Article; though I took
most of those comments to heart, I did not embrace all, and neither would likely agree with
everything I say in this Article.  I am indebted to Stephanie Strider for outstanding research
assistance.
1. In re Kosmos Energy Ltd. Sec. Litig., 299 F.R.D. 133, 139 (N.D. Tex. 2014).  Others agree:
“Both Congress and the federal judiciary have taken steps to make one oft-found element of
modern American private enforcement regimes—class action litigation—harder to maintain.”
Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 714 (2013).
2. Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013).
497
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Actions as We Know Them.”3 Professor Arthur Miller—who was pre-
sent at the creation of the modern class action—has suggested that we
face “the death of aggregate litigation by a thousand paper cuts.”4
But he, at least, sees some “rays of light that indicate it will survive.”5
It is likely an overstatement to claim that any of these prominent aca-
demics foresees the imminent demise of American class actions.  But
as we shall see, lawyers sometimes view things in more apocalyptic
terms.6  At the same time, most or all would probably agree with
Judge Boyle about the increasing headwinds that plaintiffs face.
Without questioning in the least the idea that proponents of the
class action have suffered some reverses recently,7 I intend to argue
that Professor Miller’s optimism about American aggregate litigation
is justified.  Like Confucius’ green reed, the class action is likely to
bend in the breeze and survive the current, cold climate.  In significant
part, this attitude stems from an appreciation of the exceptional char-
acter of American class actions in particular and the American bench
and bar in general.  As Professor Christopher Hodges of Oxford be-
gan his study of European techniques for affording relief in court to
groups, lawmakers in Europe sought to avoid “a US-style court-based
mechanism.”8  And Canadian Professor Janet Walker introduced an
international panel on group litigation in Moscow by noting that “eve-
ryone, at least outside the United States, seems also to agree that they
do not want to adopt U.S.-style class actions in their legal systems.”9
Against this background, it does not seem that American aggregate
litigation in general, and class actions in particular, are in danger of
extinction.  Indeed, one book published in 2014 on European group
litigation worries in its title whether they—compared to American ag-
3. Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class
Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399 (2014); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57
ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 199 (2015) (forecasting a “world without class actions”).
4. Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic
Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 306 (2014).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., infra notes 84–93 and accompanying text (regarding the possible impact of the R
Supreme Court’s pending ruling on the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, which plays a central role
in class certification for securities fraud suits).
7. See, e.g., Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the
Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324, 326 (2011) (examining the momentum
behind a relatively new (then) willingness of courts to make class certification turn on evaluation
of the merits—or at least of the manner in which the merits would have to be resolved).  This
trend was likely on Judge Boyle’s mind when she ruminated on the current challenges to class
actions. See In re Kosmos Energy Ltd. Sec. Litig., 299 F.R.D. 133, 139 (N.D. Tex. 2014).
8. CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN EURO-
PEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 1 (2008).
9. Janet Walker, Who’s Afraid of U.S. Style Class Actions?, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 509, 509 (2011).
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gregate litigation—are “squeaking mice,”10 and Dean Klonoff has re-
cently explained why most nations do not have U.S.-style class
actions.11
I will proceed, in Part I, by introducing the “golden age” of class
actions12 and then, in Part II, contrasting that time with the headwinds
now facing those who pursue these cases.13  I then turn to three sorts
of reactions to the current situation—in Part III, the overstatement of
the importance of recent changes,14 in Part IV, strategies for coping
with these headwinds,15 and in Part V, concerns about precluding pri-
vate enforcement of public law norms16—in service to a conclusion
like the one reached by Professor Miller: “Aggregate litigation is not
becoming a creature of purely historical import: there are some rays
of light that indicate it will survive.”17
I. THE GOLDEN AGE
As Professor Mullenix put it, “class litigation in the twenty-first cen-
tury has moved a very long way from the golden age of class litigation
during the 1960s.”18  That golden age characterization may involve
what I have recently called the “heroic model” of litigation.19  In that,
it may fit with other “golden ages,” such as the golden age of procedu-
ral rulemaking on which some commentators now cast an envious
backward gaze.20  In terms of single events, the amendment of Federal
10. See MULTI-PARTY REDRESS MECHANISMS IN EUROPE: SQUEAKING MICE? (V. Harsa´gi &
C.H. van Rhee eds., 2014).
11. See Robert H. Klonoff, Why Most Nations Do Not Have U.S.-Style Class Actions, 16
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 586 (May 22, 2015).  Dean Klonoff offers three basic reasons
for the distinctiveness of American class actions:  (1) the use of “opt-out” rather than opt-in
procedure; (2) the absence of a “loser pays” rule in the United States, meaning that filing a class
action does not raise the risk that an unsuccessful plaintiff will be ruined due to having to pay the
defendant’s litigation costs, including attorney fees; and (3) the existence of multidistrict litiga-
tion procedures, providing an alternative to class actions in some cases. Id. at 587.
12. See infra notes 18–45 and accompanying text. R
13. See infra notes 46–93 and accompanying text. R
14. See infra notes 94–121 and accompanying text. R
15. See infra notes 122–43 and accompanying text. R
16. See infra notes 144–96 and accompanying text. R
17. Miller, supra note 4, at 306; see infra notes 197–213 and accompanying text. R
18. Mullenix, supra note 3, at 404. R
19. See Richard Marcus, “Looking Backward” to 1938, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1696–98
(2014) (describing the “heroic model” in litigation).
20. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 897–99 (1999) (entitling a section of the
article “The Golden Age of Court Rulemaking”).  That was, of course, the age of the giants of
the past, to be contrasted with the hamstrung and disappointing experience with the pygmies of
the present.  Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901 (2002)
(exploring the challenges of contemporary procedural rulemaking).  “For at least a generation,
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Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in 1966 is about as golden as it gets; it was
surely the “big bang” of modern class-action litigation.
Whether the golden age was really so golden is a topic of much
current debate.  As very thoughtfully reviewed by Professor David
Marcus (no relation), it may be viewed as involving a still-unresolved
tension between a regulatory impulse and an efficiency argument
(which he calls “adjectival” after Bentham).21  We will return to that
tension in Part V, on the current private enforcement puzzle.  But it
may also be regarded as an innocent era in which relatively “apoliti-
cal” impulses toward the goals of “good government” could inspire
moves toward procedural perfection that seem somewhat inconsistent
with the rulemakers’ personal or political goals.22
It is relatively clear that one goal of the 1962–1966 rewriting of Rule
23 was to provide an explicit rule provision to enable injunction suits
to enforce civil rights.23  Whether that was absolutely necessary can, in
retrospect, be debated.  The vehicle for this sort of suit was to be the
Rule 23(b)(2) action for injunctive or declaratory relief.  But subse-
quent history has taught that lawyers increasingly tried to use this rule
to include claims for monetary relief, sometimes perhaps camouflag-
ing their desire for damages behind a false front requesting injunctive
or declaratory relief, to avoid some of the rigors that attend certifica-
tion under Rule 23(b)(3).24  As Judge Posner put it: “Class action law-
yers like to sue under [(b)(2)] because it is less demanding, in a variety
of ways, than Rule 23(b)(3) suits, which usually are the only available
alternative.”25  A particular favorite in this regard was the employ-
ment discrimination class action seeking back pay and front pay as
“equitable relief” under Rule 23(b)(2), something that the Supreme
Court put to an end in 2011.26
commentary on federal judicial rulemaking has been gloomy.”  Richard D. Freer, The Continu-
ing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 473 (2013).
21. See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang,
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 591–98 (2013).
22. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress,
59 BROOK. L. REV. 761 (1993), for an examination of the course of federal procedural rulemak-
ing from a “neutralist” perspective that strives to treat achieving advantage for clients as at most
a secondary consequence not an objective.
23. 7AA CHARLES WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1776 (3d
ed. 2005).  “[S]ubdivision (b)(2) was added to Rule 23 in 1966 in part to make it clear that civil-
rights suits for injunctive or declaratory relief can be brought as class actions.” Id.
24. Two hurdles for (b)(3) class actions that do not apply to (b)(2) class actions are the re-
quirement that common questions “predominate” in (b)(3) class actions and the requirement (in
Rule 23(c)(2)(b)) that individual notice be sent to all class members in (b)(3) actions who can be
identified with “reasonable effort.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2), (b)(3), (c)(2)(b).
25. Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 637 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2011).
26. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL211.txt unknown Seq: 5 15-JUL-16 11:24
2016] BENDING IN THE BREEZE 501
But a fair argument might be made that class certification, with its
attendant binding effect on all class members, was not necessary (or
even beneficial) to class members who did not want monetary relief.
As time went by, it emerged that class certification was sometimes
necessary for class-wide injunctive relief.27  To the extent that the true
thrust of the suit was to obtain an injunction requiring defendant to
treat all members of the class in the same (and legal) manner, Rule
23(b)(1)(A) (also added to the rule in 1966) seemed to do the job
because it authorizes certification when separate litigation creates a
significant risk that the defendant will face “incompatible standards of
conduct” if separate suits for injunctive relief proceed
independently.28
Moreover, it might be asked whether a new rule provision was re-
ally necessary to further the civil rights cause.  The skeptical could
point to the NAACP’s relatively successful litigation campaign to dis-
mantle segregation in several areas of American life without relying
on the modern class-action rule (although the pre-1966 class action
was invoked in that litigation).  It was surely true that, after 1966,
there was an outburst of class-action litigation for social justice pur-
poses, laying the groundwork for Professor Abram Chayes’s 1976
landmark article on public interest litigation.29  But it is difficult to
regard the current class action rule as essential to that activity or suffi-
cient to support continuing that activity.  At least Judge Easterbrook
regards such activity as “a relic of a time when the federal judiciary
thought that structural injunctions taking control of executive func-
tions were sensible.  That time is past.”30
27. See, e.g., Meyer v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc’y., 648 F.3d 154, 171 (3d Cir. 2011) (vacating an
injunction prescribing procedures for defendant to use to process disability claims because it
“amounted to class-wide relief and no class was certified”); Everhart v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 1532,
1538 (10th Cir. 1988), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 95
(1990) (reasoning that the district court improperly granted a statewide injunction because that
was “tantamount to a grant of class-wide relief”); see 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (2012) (“Prospective
relief in any civil action . . . shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right of a particular plaintiff . . . .”).
A contrasting line of authority supported the notion that certification is not necessary if an
injunction in an individual suit would operate to protect the entire class without the need for
class certification.  See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 23, § 1785.2, for a discussion of this R
issue.  But for a variety of reasons, such as avoiding mootness and making clear that class mem-
bers can seek contempt sanctions if defendants violate the decree, this notion can be challenged.
See Daniel Tenny, Note, There Is Always a Need: The “Necessity Doctrine” and Class Certifica-
tion Against Government Agencies, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1026 n.47, 1032 (2005).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
29. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976).
30. Rahman v. Chertoff, 530 F.3d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2008).  But it is clear that some such
litigation continues to occur, whether or not in the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131
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One need not agree with Judge Easterbrook to recognize that the
framers of the amended class-action rule probably did not foresee the
main uses to which it is put nowadays.  At least one was partly fore-
seen—the “mass accident”—and the framers tried to guard against
that sort of class action by saying in the Committee Note that individ-
ual issues would usually predominate and, as a result, that class certifi-
cation under the new Rule 23(b)(3) provision should not be allowed.31
But as the Supreme Court recognized in 1997, despite the Committee
Note “the text of the Rule does not categorically exclude mass tort
cases from class certification, and District Courts, since the late 1970’s,
have been certifying such cases in increasing number.”32
All in all, then, it is difficult to disagree with Professor Miller when
he recalls that the framers of the current rule could not foresee many
of the ways lawyers and judges would ultimately use it:
Those were relatively simple days in the world of litigation.  The
Committee obviously could not predict the great growth in compli-
cated federal and state substantive law that would take place in such
fields as race, gender, disability, and age discrimination; consumer
protection; fraud; products liability; environmental safety; and pen-
sion litigation, let alone the exponential increase in class action and
multiparty/multi-claim practice that would flow form the expansion
of those legal subjects.33
As Professor Sean Farhang has pointed out, much of the legislation
cited by Professor Miller deputized private litigants to enforce public
law.34  Because one may take Congress (and state legislatures) as act-
ing with the existing procedural system in mind when they create new
S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (imposing crowding limitations on the overcrowded California prison system
on constitutional grounds).  Professor Samuel Issacharoff has described Brown as “the most sig-
nificant class action litigation of the past decade.”  Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State
Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 375 (2012).  Perhaps that shows that these cases are very
unusual, but that does not seem to be Professor Issacharoff’s point; certainly this case shows that
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions can continue to pack a punch.
31.
A “mass accident” resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropri-
ate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of
damages but also of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the
individuals in different ways.  In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as
a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966 Amendments).
32. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997).
33. See Miller, supra note 4, at 295.  At the same time, it is clear that much of the debate R
within the Committee between 1962 and 1966 had a distinctly modern flavor to it, particularly
regarding the possibility of mass tort class actions. See John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class
Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. REV. 323, 335–36 (2005) (describing
the objections of John Frank to such a use of the class action).
34. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAW-
SUITS IN THE U.S. 4 (2010).
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causes of action, it is possible to argue that the modern class action
was assumed to be available for that enforcement purpose.  But that
idea is not entirely persuasive.  As Justice Scalia pointed out in dealing
with the argument that class action waivers should not be enforced in
antitrust suits because Congress intended to enable private enforce-
ment, Congress authorized private suits alleging antitrust violations
long before the modern class action came into existence.35  Similarly,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which left primary enforce-
ment responsibility to private litigants rather than the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), was adopted before the 1966
amendment to Rule 23.36  Surely that is not a reason to refuse to use
amended Rule 23 in antitrust or Title VII cases.
For our purposes, it is important to remember that the golden age
was quite short, even if it was golden.  By the mid-1970s, as Professor
Miller chronicled in 1979, “class action practice had been given a very
black eye,”37 in part because district courts sometimes seemed to
adopt a “certify now, reconsider later” attitude, focusing in part on
then-existing permission in Rule 23 for “conditional” certification.38
In addition, as he put it, decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court had
dealt “shocking” body blows to the use of Rule 23.39  Professor Miller
was speaking of the U.S. Supreme Court holdings about the cost of
giving notice in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions40 and the application of the
amount-in-controversy requirement in class actions making state-law
claims.41  For a time it seemed that class actions might fade away; in
35. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013).
36. See FARHANG, supra note 34, at 94–101, for a description of the legislative development of R
the statute.  In brief, Senate Republican votes were essential to passage, and the business estab-
lishment was adamantly opposed to giving the EEOC enforcement power because they feared it
would be adverse to their interests in the same way they took the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) to be adverse to their interests.  Whether they would like to take that choice
back, in light of the way public life has evolved over the last half century, is impossible to know.
37. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
“Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 678 (1979).
38. The 2003 amendments removed the prior authority for conditional certification.  The com-
mittee note accompanying this change explained: “A court that is not satisfied that the require-
ments of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been met.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (2003 Amendment).
39. Miller, supra note 37, at 679–80. R
40. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178–79 (1974) (holding that individual
first-class mail notice of class certification had to be given to more than two million class mem-
bers and that plaintiffs had to pay for it).
41. See, e.g., Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that even if the class
representative had a large enough claim to satisfy the jurisdictional minimum individually every
other class member had to satisfy it also); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336–39 (1969) (holding
that the claims of the putative class members could not be cumulated to satisfy the jurisdictional
minimum).
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1988 the New York Times ran an article quoting Professor Miller’s
successor as Reporter of the Advisory Committee saying that “class
actions had their day in the sun and kind of petered out.”42  Around
the same time, it was reported that class actions had declined signifi-
cantly as a device for employment discrimination suits.43
As with other forms of nostalgia, then, it seems that the durable
impact of the class action golden age is not entirely impressive and
that it may have been waning by the late 1980s.  But the worm did
begin to turn in the 1990s.  By 1997, the Chair of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules was able to tell a Senate Committee that the
class action was “transforming the litigation landscape,” and that
“[c]lass actions are being certified at unprecedented rates, and they
are involving a substantial [number], if not a majority, of all American
citizens.”44  By 2002, it was reported that “the class action device has
changed from the more or less rare case fought out by titans of the bar
in the top financial centers of the nation to the veritable bread and
butter of firms of all shapes and sizes across the country.”45  Around
this point, the headwinds began to pick up.
II. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CLASS-ACTION HEADWINDS
Since 2002, a number of things have changed for class actions.  In
2003, revisions were made to Rule 23—the first significant amend-
ments to the body of the rule since 1966.46  The 2003 amendments did
not directly address the criteria for class certification, but they did fo-
cus on the process of certification and settlement approval, including
changes to existing Rules 23(c) and (e) and the addition of Rules
23(g) and (h), dealing with appointment of class counsel and attorney
fee awards to class counsel.  In 2005, Congress adopted the Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act (CAFA), which broadened the subject matter juris-
42. Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1988,
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/08/us/the-law-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-class-action-lawsuit.html
(quoting Professor Paul Carrington).
43. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1019–21, 1020 figs. 8 & 9 (1991).
44. Senate Subcommittee Holds Hearing on Class Action Litigation Reform, 66 U.S.L.W. 2294
(U.S. Nov. 18, 1997) (second alteration in original) (quoting Judge Paul Niemyer).
45. Benjamine Reid & Chris S. Coutroulis, Checkmate in Class Actions: Defensive Strategy in
the Initial Moves, LITIGATION, Winter 2002, at 21, 21.
46. In 1996, a preliminary draft of possible changes to the certification standards was pub-
lished for comment. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Appellate, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 523, 559–60 (1996).  But they did not pro-
ceed further after very vigorous public commentary; the only change to the rule at that time was
the adoption of Rule 23(f), authorizing discretionary appellate review of class-certification deci-
sions. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
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diction of the federal courts in state-law class actions.47  Although
some predicted that this legislation would eliminate the state-court
class action, that did not happen.  In California, there was a modest
decline in the number of state-court class actions, but they remained
more numerous in 2005 than they had been in 2002.48  In 2011, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that state-court class actions could continue
even after a federal court had held that a substantially similar class
should not be certified.49
In general, these developments were greeted more enthusiastically
by the defense bar than the plaintiff bar.50  Indeed, plaintiffs’ lawyers
even made some energetic arguments about CAFA being unconstitu-
tional.  But if there is presently an attitude of gloom within the plain-
tiff bar, it is probably much more the result of Supreme Court
decisions than of statutory or rule changes.  One would expect that a
Supreme Court that ruefully observed in a 2010 securities law decision
that “some fear that [the United States] has become the Shangri-La of
class-action litigation”51 might create a headwind for plaintiffs in class
actions.
There is much to show that this has happened, as Judge Boyle ob-
served.52  This Article does not provide an in-depth analysis of these
cases,53 but surely the defense side had more to cheer about than the
plaintiff bar.
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,54 the Court held, 5-4, that the
Rule 23(a)(2) commonality requirement was not satisfied with regard
to a giant class of female employees of Wal-Mart because the com-
pany gave individual managers discretion to make promotion and sal-
47. See Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1765 (2008), for a review of this expansion of federal court jurisdiction.
48. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, OFFICE OF COURT RESEARCH, FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION, 2000–2006: FIRST INTERIM REPORT 3 fig.1 (2009).
49. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (2011).
50. That was surely not true of all the Court’s decisions. Smith v. Bayer made it possible for
plaintiffs’ lawyers defeated on class certification in federal court to seek certification of a similar
class in state court despite the adverse federal court ruling. See  131 S. Ct. 2368.  The expanded
federal court jurisdiction available under CAFA could curtail those opportunities, however.
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co., held that a state law forbidding
class actions with regard to certain claims created by state law did not apply in federal court to
preclude class certification because Rule 23 governed certification. 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010).
Though this situation would not often reappear, it was an ironic consequence of CAFA, which
opened the federal courts to more class actions.  See infra notes 81–93 and accompanying text, R
for a further discussion of this case.
51. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010).
52. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
53. See Mary Kay Kane, The Supreme Court’s Recent Class Action Jurisprudence: Gazing into
a Crystal Ball, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1015 (2012), for an early effort.
54. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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ary decisions.  One may characterize this decision as turning more on
Title VII law than on class-action principles.  Plaintiffs emphasized the
seemingly striking disparity in the promotion rate of men and women,
but the Court ruled that statistical proof was not sufficient to satisfy
the commonality requirement in light of the company’s delegation of
discretion to managers to make these decisions:
The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence convincing
establishes is Wal-Mart’s “policy” of allowing discretion by local su-
pervisors over employment matters.  On its face, of course, that is
just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that would pro-
vide the commonality needed for a class action; it is a policy against
having uniform employment practices.  It is also a very common and
presumptively reasonable way of doing business—one that we have
said “should itself raise no inference of discriminatory conduct.”55
From this perspective, then, each supervisor’s decision making
presented a distinct question under Title VII.  Given the size and geo-
graphical range of Wal-Mart stores, it becomes difficult to articulate a
legal question that binds together female Wal-Mart employees from
Alaska to Florida in a wide variety of types of retail outlets and differ-
ent employment positions with Wal-Mart.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg seemed to view employment discrimi-
nation law very differently:
The District Court’s identification of a common question,
whether Wal-Mart’s pay and promotions policies gave rise to unlaw-
ful discrimination, was hardly infirm.  The practice of delegating to
supervisors large discretion to make personnel decisions, uncon-
trolled by formal standards, has long been known to have the poten-
tial to produce disparate effects.  Managers, like all humankind,
may be prey to biases of which they are unaware.  The risk of dis-
crimination is heightened when those mangers are predominantly of
one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that perpetuates
gender stereotypes.56
55. Id. at 2554 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988)).
56. Id. at 2564 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
Justice Ginsburg’s view of employment discrimination law can be contrasted with Professor
Richard Nagareda’s description of the case, which was written before the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision:
The crux of the contested class certification in Dukes, however, has very little to do
with dueling expert statisticians, ambiguous facts properly for the jury, or factual as-
pects of class certification requirements to be reviewed on appeal only for abuse of
discretion.  Rather, the conflict over class certification is, at bottom, one over the mean-
ing of governing law eminently suited for de novo appellate review—over whether Title
VII, properly read, embraces the discrimination-by-conduit notion advanced by the
Dukes plaintiffs and elaborated by scholars under the rubric of structural
discrimination.
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From her perspective, then, Title VII law should command measures
to banish the possibility that decisions could be made by people who
are “prey to biases of which they are unaware” if discretionary deci-
sion making seemed to lead to disparate results.57  Whether or not
that is a common question that “predominates,”58 that would seem
sufficient to satisfy the common question requirement of Rule
23(a)(2).
Thus, it can be debated whether Wal-Mart has major significance
for class actions outside the employment discrimination sphere or
even for the commonality issue presented in most employment dis-
crimination class actions.  In Wal-Mart, the Court also unanimously
rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2)
on the ground that Title VII back-pay awards could be included in
such a case as “equitable” relief and said instead that only “inciden-
tal” monetary relief for the class could be included under Rule
23(b)(2).59  There may be a temptation for plaintiffs’ lawyers to “shoe-
horn” their cases into Rule 23(b)(2) to ease the path to class certifica-
tion.60  But one could at least ask—given the size and complexity of
the Wal-Mart operation—what injunction would adequately address
the supposedly recurrent differential treatment of women employees.
Surely there are examples of federal courts taking over public institu-
tions, such as prisons, and “running” them, immersing the courts in
the complexity of such a task.  But it is worth noting that doing so with
a private enterprise might seem a stretch too far.
Beyond a doubt, Wal-Mart has had an impact.  On remand, the dis-
trict court refused to certify a less ambitious class making similar
claims against Wal-Mart.61  At much the same time, however, a gen-
der discrimination class action against Costco proceeded.62  In another
Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97,
159 (2009).  The majority quoted this article with apparent favor. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at
2551.
57. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2564 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
58. This is the standard for certification under Rule 23(b)(3), not Rule 23(b)(2), on which
plaintiffs relied in Wal-Mart. Id. at 2559.
59. Id. at 2557.
60. E.g., Randall v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 637 F.3d 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Class action law-
yers like to sue under [(b)(2)] because it is less demanding, in a variety of ways, than Rule
23(b)(3) suits . . . .”); Bolin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 F.3d 970, 976 (5th Cir. 2000)
(“[P]laintiffs may attempt to shoehorn damages actions into the Rule 23(b)(2) framework . . . .”).
61. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2013).  But other
less ambitious suits continue. See, e.g., Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 13–6194, 2015 WL
4079441 (6th Cir. July 7, 2015) (proposing a class action on behalf of present and former employ-
ees in Wal-Mart Region 43).
62. See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  It has been re-
ported that the class action settled for $8 million, including “an unusually tailor-made system for
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case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the “spec-
ter of decertification” in the wake of Wal-Mart supported the district
court’s conclusion that the “significant risk of decertification” pro-
vided a reason for approving a proposed settlement.63  Whether em-
ployment discrimination class actions will in the future be the big deal
in discrimination litigation that they once were might be debated as
well.  But as we have seen,64 the heyday of employment discrimination
class actions was really some time ago.
Another headwind comes from the increasing insistence of federal
courts on detailed support for class certification.65  Actually, the Court
had insisted on “rigorous” scrutiny of the evidentiary support for class
certification since 1982.66 Comcast Corp. v. Behrend67 appeared to
present the Court with an opportunity to emphasize the need for a full
Daubert review of expert submissions in support of class certification,
something Wal-Mart suggested should be required.68  The Court’s
grant of certiorari in Comcast indicated that this was its goal,69 but it
eventually turned out that the issue had not been preserved and the
Court therefore could not decide it.70  Nonetheless, it did reverse on
the ground that plaintiff’s expert evidence only supported one of four
theories for antitrust impact and damages, making individual ques-
tions predominate.71
This decision also cast something of a pall over class certification
efforts.  But it was not a tsunami.  Consider what happened with the
cases in which the Court vacated earlier certifications and remanded
for reconsideration consistent with the Comcast analysis.  On remand,
awarding damages to individual class members.”  Laura Hautala, Women Win $8M from Costco,
S.F. DAILY J., Dec. 19, 2013, at 3.
63. Charron v. Wiener, 731 F.3d 241, 248–49 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he heightened legal uncer-
tainty necessarily injected by significant recent Supreme Court authority [is] relevant to the pro-
priety of class certification.”).
64. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. R
65. See Marcus, supra note 7, for an examination of this trend. R
66. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
67. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
68. “The District Court concluded that Daubert did not apply to expert testimony at the certi-
fication stage of class-action proceedings.  We doubt that is so . . . .”  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553–54 (2011).
69. As framed by the U.S. Supreme Court, the question presented in Comcast was: “Whether
a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class had intro-
duced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to
awarding damages on a class-wide basis.” Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1431 n.4.  See Linda S. Mullenix,
Putting Proponents to Their Proof: Evidentiary Rules at Class Certification, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 606 (2014), for a discussion of the general question of application at the certification stage
of evidentiary standards that apply at trial.
70. Id. at 1435–36 (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1433–35.
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both the Sixth72 and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals73 held that
predominance could be satisfied even if damages required some indi-
vidual treatment.  Speaking for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner was
particularly pointed in rejecting defense arguments:
It would drive a stake through the heart of the class action device,
in cases in which damages were sought rather than an injunction or
a declaratory judgment, to require that every member of the class
have identical damages.  If the issues of liability are genuinely com-
mon issues, and the damages of individual class members can be
readily determined in individual hearings, in settlement negotia-
tions, or by creation of subclasses, the fact that damages are not
identical across all class members should not preclude class certifi-
cation.  Otherwise defendants would be able to escape liability for
tortious harms of enormous aggregate magnitude but so widely dis-
tributed as not to be remediable in individual suits.74
The Supreme Court’s cavalcade of rulings enforcing arbitration
clauses seems to create a more serious headwind than the above deci-
sions.  This headwind goes beyond class actions and has been building
for three decades.  A number of state courts, such as California’s, have
attempted a rearguard action to impede the move toward noncourt
resolution. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion75 and American Ex-
press Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant76 expanded the impact on class
actions by rejecting arguments that class actions should be allowed to
proceed even in instances when individual arbitration does not seem
to be a viable opportunity.  The National Labor Relations Board’s ef-
fort to declare requiring class action waivers an unfair labor practice
was rejected by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,77 but the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that representative actions under California’s
Private Attorneys’ General Act (PAGA) could survive.78  And the Su-
preme Court itself held that an arbitrator’s decision that class arbitra-
tion is allowed under the parties’ contract cannot be overturned by a
court.79  So the headwind from arbitration clauses and class action
72. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 854 (6th
Cir. 2013).
73. See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013).
74. Id. at 801.  As suggested by Judge Posner, the possibility of issue certification under Rule
23(c)(4) may become more important due to Comcast.  Defense lawyers have reported that
“some courts have moved increasingly toward the certification of liability-only classes.” Scott
Elder & Jenny Mendelsohn, Class Action Certification Got Tougher in 2014, 37 NAT. L.J. 15, 24
(2014).
75. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
76. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
77. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 364 (5th Cir. 2013).
78. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 154–55 (Cal. 2014).
79. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013).
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waivers has been particularly strong, even though there may be pock-
ets protected from the wind.80
But the Supreme Court’s class-action decisions have not been en-
tirely to defendants’ liking.  In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v.
Allstate Insurance. Co.,81 the Court held that CAFA—legislation
widely supported by defense interests desiring to get cases into federal
court—prevented application of a New York statute forbidding class
actions for statutory penalties, and Justice Scalia wrote the Court’s
decision.  There are certainly grounds to criticize the decision,82 but it
surely was not the outcome favored by the defense bar.  Much closer
to the heart of the defense bar, at least in securities litigation, was the
possibility that the Court would abandon its 4-2 decision in 1988,
adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory,83 which was critical to class
certification in securities fraud suits, a type of litigation that some re-
gard as “the 800-pound gorilla that dominates and overshadows other
forms of class actions.”84  But the Court refused, although it did rule
that defendants could try to defeat certification by showing that the
theory should not apply in this case.85  This defeat for defense argu-
ments followed on the heels of earlier failures to persuade the Court
that “loss causation” had to be proved to obtain certification86 and
that plaintiffs must prove “materiality” of statements to invoke the
fraud-on-the-market theory.87  Sometimes the wind from the Court’s
decisions blew the plaintiffs’ way.
It may be, as Dean Mary Kay Kane foresaw, that defendants hoped
that the U.S. Supreme Court would “clos[e] the door on class ac-
tions,”88 but that has not happened.  The breeze is not a hurricane.
80. On this score, note that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Im-
burgia, in which the California courts had held a class-action waiver provision in a contract
unenforceable. 135 S. Ct. 1547, 1547 (2015).  The provision said: “If, however, the law of your
state would find this agreement to dispense with class action procedures unenforceable, then this
entire Section 9 is unenforceable.”  Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 193 (Ct.
App. 2014).  It appears that the issue before the Court was whether this language permitted an
escape from its interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), or that such a clause should
be interpreted to invoke any federal law (such as the FAA) that preempts state law. Id. at 194.
81. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
82. See Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities
of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2010), for a careful dissection of the decision.
83. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).
84. John C. Coffee Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1539 (2006).
85. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2404 (2014).
86. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2183 (2011).
87. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013).
88. Mary Kay Kane, Emeritus Dean & Chancellor, Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law,
Remarks at 2014 Randal Thrower Symposium: In a Class by Itself Has the Roberts Court
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Moreover, at least some on the defense side might not entirely wel-
come a hurricane if they could conjure one up.  For example, in 2014 a
roundtable discussion about securities litigation organized by the Cali-
fornia Lawyer included forecasts about whether the Court would
abandon the fraud-on-the-market theory.89  One defense lawyer pre-
dicted (incorrectly as things worked out) that the Court would aban-
don the theory, but he added:
What happens next, if I’m right?  I don’t think it’s necessarily
good for defendants.  There’s a pretty strong possibility Congress
will step in, and what Congress eventually does could be worse for
defendants or for plaintiffs; no one can say.  Assuming Basic [the
1988 case adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory] is reversed and
Congress doesn’t step in, you’ll still have derivative suits.  That
would be the most logical place for the plaintiffs to go and file state
court derivative actions.90
Another defense attorney offered additional thoughts about the real
consequences of a complete defense knockout of the theory:
You cannot settle a claim against 5 or 10 or 15 or 20 institutional
investors and foreclose anybody but those same investors from pur-
suing new claims.  And heaven knows what would happen if Con-
gress increased the budget for the SEC for this purpose by 30 or 40
percent.  Why is that better for defendants?91
After the Supreme Court spoke on fraud-on-the-market, defense
lawyers explained that the Court had adopted a “middle ground” ap-
proach: “Now that the Court has given the green light to defendants
to challenge price inflation claims at class certification, we can expect
more protracted Daubert style evidentiary hearings at class certifica-
tion with battling financial economists and events studies.”92  It should
be no surprise that obtaining class certification will involve more work
and more expense.93
Slammed the Courthouse Door on Class Actions?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=Edpzj_1QGWg (quote at 10:48).
89. 2014 Roundtable Series: Securities, CAL. LAWYER, Jan. 2014, at 47.  See infra notes 116–18 R
and accompanying text, for a discussion of the fraud-on-the-market theory.
90. 2014 Roundtable Series: Securities, supra note 89, at 49 (quoting Peter Stone, a partner at
Paul Hastings).
91. Id. at 48 (quoting Matthew Larrabee, a partner at Dechert).
92. Miranda Schiller & David Schwartz, Halliburton II: The Securities Fraud-on-the-Market
Presumption Is Here To Stay, METRO. CORP. COUNS., July/Aug. 2014, at 29, 29, http://www.metro
corpcounsel.com/pdf/2014/July/29.pdf.
93. Marcus, supra note 7, at 355–59 (predicting that greater attention to the merits would R
mean more work for lawyers and judges).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\65-2\DPL211.txt unknown Seq: 16 15-JUL-16 11:24
512 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:497
III. COMCAST BOMBAST
Although the wind has shifted against class certification, that shift
may not be as complete as some would prefer.  But it seems that law-
yers who seek to defeat certification are inclined to claim that the
Court’s decisions have dealt their opponents a knockout punch.  Per-
haps major Supreme Court decisions invite aggressive overstatement
of what the Court actually ruled.  In this context, I call this tendency
“Comcast bombast,” invoking the name of a recent case.94  That be-
havior may be good for business or at least in generating fees for vig-
orously litigating issues that would not previously have seemed worth
litigating.
First take Wal-Mart.  True, that was a “significant legal develop-
ment,” as Judge Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit noted.95  But even the
Court’s opinion in Wal-Mart bore indications that it viewed the case
(like Amchem) as extraordinary, and not a “normal” class action.  Yet
it appears that a considerable number of defense counsel have ad-
vanced Wal-Mart challenges to certification in cases that differ greatly
from the one before the Court.  For example, a district judge in New
York reacted to a defense motion to decertify a class by saying: “If the
reader wonders exactly what [Wal-Mart’s] commonality analysis has
to do with this case, s/he is likely not alone.”96  In 2012, Judge Posner
rejected a defense effort to apply the Court’s analysis in the case
before the Seventh Circuit because it did not present the problems
that were present in Wal-Mart.97  More recently, Judge Easterbrook
has rejected a defense argument based on Wal-Mart and Comcast con-
cerning common proof of damages on the ground that “Wal-Mart has
nothing to do with commonality of damages.”98
Even in cases dramatically different from Wal-Mart, there were de-
fense efforts to invoke the case.  For example, in a case involving the
D.C. school district’s alleged failure to provide individually tailored
education plans for disabled children, Judge Harry Edwards chastised
defense counsel for trying to invoke Wal-Mart in support of their
challenge:
94. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
95. See Wang v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 709 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir.), withdrawn, superseded
by 737 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that “the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart presents a suffi-
ciently significant legal development” to excuse defendant’s failure to discuss commonality
under Rule 23(a)(2) in its opening brief).
96. Jermyn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 276 F.R.D. 167, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
97. Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 2012).
98. In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2014).
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The argument raised by the District is astonishing because it is
patently wrong. Wal-Mart surely does not foreclose a class action to
challenge a city policy that effectively precludes protected parties
from even being considered for benefits that would otherwise be
available.  And all claimants who are similarly blocked by the policy
may join a class action to challenge it.  Such a class action would
easily satisfy the commonality requirement . . . even after Wal-
Mart.99
Not only for alliterative reasons, Comcast appears to have released
more bombast.  For one thing, the dissent by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer seemed to belittle the decision as insignificant, asserting that
the decision “breaks no new ground on the standard for certifying a
class action,” and that it “is good for this day and case only.”100  Al-
most from the outset, there was vigorous public disagreement about
whether the Court had really done anything.  The plaintiff-side view,
if it can be called that, was that Justices Ginsburg and Breyer were
right, particularly because plaintiffs in the case conceded that they had
to show that they would offer class-wide damages proof to obtain cer-
tification, so the Court was not presented with the question of
whether they had to make such a showing in that case or whether it
was always necessary that there be a class-wide method of proof.
From the defense side, one senses that the view was something
more like: “Yes Comcast did matter!  Things are really, really differ-
ent!”101  Some even claimed that the Court had actually decided
whether Daubert applied at the certification stage, something the cer-
tiorari grant suggested would be decided but that turned out not to be
ripe for decision in the case.102  More recent analyses by lawyers iden-
99. DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Edwards, J., concurring).
The majority had vacated certification on other grounds. Id. at 121.
100. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1436–37 (2013) (Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J.,
dissenting).  Tongue in cheek, one might argue that the fact that Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
chose to deliver their dissents orally showed that the Court’s ruling was important.  In a story
about Justice Scalia, the New York Times said that Scalia would present an oral dissent only in
cases in which he regarded the Court’s decision as particularly important, adding: “By that stan-
dard, the dissenters thought the Comcast decision was very bad indeed.  It gave rise to two oral
dissents, from the two senior members of the court’s liberal wing, Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen G. Breyer.”  Adam Liptak, Corporations Find a Friend in the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/business/pro-business-decisions-are-de-
fining-this-supreme-court.html?_r=0.
101. James Speyer & Kelly Welchans, A Class Action Game Changer, S.F. DAILY J., Apr. 29,
2013 (arguing that Comcast was in fact a “game changer”). See also David E. Kouba & Carolyn
A. Pearce, Comcast in Review: Courts in 2015 Continue To Require Evidence of Class-Wide
Damages Before Granting Class Certification, 17 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 1 (2016).
102. See Jessie Kokrda Kamens, What Comes Next After Comcast? SCOTUS May Wade into
Issue Certification, 14 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 1537, 1537 (2013) (citing “several class
action practitioners” who spoke at an event put on by the International Association of Defense
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tified with the defense side have been more measured, such as:
“whether Comcast changed the law is largely a side issue for now, be-
cause it undeniably has broadly affected how courts apply the law.”103
In court, it appears that Comcast was used frequently and aggres-
sively.  In the words of one district court judge: “Comcast explicitly
extended to Rule 23(b)(3) the Rule 23(a) requirement that courts
must conduct a ‘rigorous’ analysis to determine that Rule 23 has been
satisfied at the class certification stage.”104  But that had already
seemed true to many.105  Since the Supreme Court’s decision, inter-
preting Comcast seems to have divided the lower courts.106
Taking a step back, one can regard a fair amount of the post-Com-
cast activity as resulting from or relying on overstatement of the
Court’s holding.  Indeed, even in Comcast itself, it appears that on
remand the district court was receptive to recertifying, albeit for a nar-
rower class.107  After deciding Comcast, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded in two other cases for reconsideration in light of its
ruling, but on remand the Sixth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals recertified.108  A defendant in the Sixth Circuit case petitioned
the Court for review, and the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed
piece by the President of the Business Roundtable saying that “Amer-
ican manufacturers could soon face an onslaught of lawsuits unless the
Supreme Court intervenes.”109  But the Court denied certiorari.110
Counsel as saying that “[t]he question of whether Daubert applies at the class certification stage
has been put to rest by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast”).
103. Joel S. Feldman & Daniel R. Thies, Comcast’s Lasting Impact: Crystallization and Affir-
mation of the Rule 23(b)(3) Predominance Requirement, 15 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA)
574, 574 (2014).
104. Nieberding v. Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 600, 617 (D. Kan. 2014) (quoting
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013)).
105. See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 309–10 (3d Cir. 2008)
(enumerating the demanding “finding” requirements district courts must satisfy to certify a class
under Rule 23(b)(3)).  See Marcus, supra note 7, at 326–27, for a discussion of the case. R
106. As summed up by the district court in Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc.:
Broadly, the class-certification decisions applying Comcast can be divided into three,
distinct groups: (1) courts distinguishing Comcast, and finding a common formula at the
class certification stage, and thus, predominance, satisfied; (2) courts applying Comcast
and rejecting class certification on the ground that no common formula exists for the
determination of damages; and (3) courts embracing a middle approach whereby they
employ Rule 23(c)(4) and maintain class certification as to liability only, leaving dam-
ages for a separate, individualized determination.
293 F.R.D. 578, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations omitted).
107. Glaberson v. Comcast Corp., 295 F.R.D. 95, 103 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (rejecting defendants’
motion to strike plaintiffs’ motion to certify).
108. See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2013); In re Whirlpool
Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 861 (6th Cir. 2013).
109. John Engler, Opinion, Trial Lawyers Put Whirlpool Through the Wringer, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 30, 2013, at A15.
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Beyond that, lower courts have repeatedly faced (and often re-
jected) arguments that Comcast permits certification only in cases in
which there is class-wide proof of the amount of damages.111  Some
courts of appeals found the argument persuasive in analogous anti-
trust settings,112 but others found otherwise. For example, in early
2015, the Second Circuit confronted “the question whether the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend overruled the
law in this Circuit that class certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) . . .
cannot be denied merely because damages have to be ascertained on
an individual basis,” and it answered: no.113  Other courts have
agreed.114  Speaking for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook re-
jected defense arguments that prior decisions of that court were no
longer good law, adding that if the defense arguments were correct
“then class actions about consumer products are impossible.”115
It is not surprising that, when the Supreme Court declares that
there should be a significant change in a legal rule or practice, the
lower courts have to grapple with the implementation and ramifica-
tions of the change.  It is also unsurprising that lawyers may be
tempted to overstate (to courts) and oversell (to clients) the impor-
tance of the changes announced by the Court.  But it sometimes seems
110. Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014) (mem.).
111. See, e.g., Robert Rachal et al., Labor and Employment and ERISA Class Actions After
Wal-Mart and Comcast—Practice Points for Defendants (Part I—Commonality), DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA), Nov. 25, 2013, at I-1, I-1 to I-2.
After Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court again altered the landscape of class action litiga-
tion when in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend the Court applied what it called the “straight-
forward application of class certification principles” to issues of class damages.  Though
Comcast is not a labor and employment case, its import is clear:  plaintiffs’ damages
theory must (i) match their class liability theory and (ii) be able to prove damages on a
[class-wide] basis, free from taint form individualized harms.
Id.
112. See, e.g., In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 253 (D.C. Cir.
2013):
As we see it, Behrend sharpens the defendants’ critique of the damages model as
prone to false positives.  It is now indisputably the role of the district court to scrutinize
the evidence before granting certification, even when doing so “requires inquiry into
the merits of the claim.” [quoting Comcast] If the damages model cannot withstand this
scrutiny then, that is not just a merits issue.  [Plaintiffs’ expert’s] models are essential to
the plaintiffs’ claim they can offer common evidence of [class-wide] injury.  No dam-
ages model, no predominance, no class certification.
113. Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 402, 405 (2d Cir. 2015).
114. See, e.g., In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2015) (recognizing the
“well-established” principle that individualized damages do not automatically defeat certifica-
tion); In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1255 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Class-wide proof is
not required for all issues.”); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 817 (5th Cir. 2014) (re-
jecting the notion that Comcast requires a common methodology for measuring class-wide
damages).
115. In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2014).
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that this “sales job” strays into bombast.  To take the fraud-on-the-
market rule,116 a defense view was that the impending Supreme Court
decision meant that securities fraud class actions were “on the chop-
ping block” because they depended on this rule.117  From the plain-
tiff’s perspective, things evidently looked much the same; one
pessimistic plaintiffs’ lawyer predicted, before the Supreme Court’s
decision, that the fraud-on-the-market theory “is basically finished,”
and he added that “the noose around securities class actions has been
tightening ever since 1995.”118  But at the same time, it was also re-
ported that the number of securities class actions was increasing.119
And when the Supreme Court refused to abandon the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine, a plaintiff-side firm boasted that the Court’s decision
was “the most significant securities case in decades” and “an impor-
tant victory for investors’ rights.”120
So doomsday and triumphal assertions must be scrutinized with
care.  That caution goes beyond securities fraud cases.  Consider the
effect of Wal-Mart on employment class actions.  Some said that the
decision would have an almost paralyzing effect on employment class
actions.  But at least one leading defense-side firm opined in 2014 that
“[e]mployment discrimination class litigation will remain ‘white hot’
in 2014 but class plaintiffs will have to continue to ‘reboot’ their class
liability theories because of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions.”121
So although the wind has been blowing against class actions, creative
plaintiffs’ lawyers continue to make headway.
IV. TACKING AGAINST THE WIND: STRATEGIES FOR COPING
WITH THE BREEZE
Reforming procedural rules once they are subject to widespread ex-
ploitation can often be characterized by the carnival game “Whac-A-
Mole.”122
116. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. R
117. See Christina Lincoln, Day of Reckoning for Securities Class Actions, L.A. DAILY J., Dec.
19, 2013, http://www.newmeyeranddillion.com/lwdcms/doc-view.php?module=news&module_id
=892&doc_name=doc.
118. Ramzi Abadou, ‘Fraud on the Market’ Is Basically over, S.F. DAILY J., Jan 27, 2014.
119. See Todd Scott & Alex Talarides, Securities Class Actions on the Rise . . . for Now, S.F.
DAILY J., Jan. 27, 2014.
120. Inside Look, ADVOCATE, Summer 2014, at 3, 5.
121. Jessie Kokrda Kamens, Employment Class Action Filings Hold Steady as Plaintiffs Adapt
to Supreme Court Decisions, 15 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 34, 34 (2014).  This story
reports on Seyfarth Shaw LLP’s Annual Workplace Class Action Report.  The report added
that: “Plaintiffs have started to prune class definitions by size, geography, unit, and policy, and
have also relied on a little-used provision of Rule 23—Rule 23(c)(4).” Id.
122. Marc S. Werner, The Viability and Strategic Significance of Class Action Alternatives
Under CAFA’s Mass Action Provisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 465, 466 (2015).
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American lawyers and judges are probably the most creative and
inventive in the world.  In the face of breezes making one sort of col-
lective litigation difficult, they have found other routes—they have
bent in the breeze rather than breaking.  Put differently, playing whac-
a-mole does not entirely defeat them.  Several obvious examples exist.
A. Changing Substantive Focus
A decade and a half ago, wage and hour collective actions were not
a major consideration.  How things have changed.  “The recent boom
of wage and hour litigation is one of the most striking developments
[of] modern legal history.”123  True, the Supreme Court has recently
confirmed that defendants in such cases may sometimes moot them by
making Rule 68 offers to the original plaintiff before others opt in.124
But the lower courts resist this notion, and the Eleventh Circuit has
even declared that it agrees with the dissent in the Supreme Court.125
It may be, of course, that the behavior of employers has, in the last
decade or two, undergone a sea change in terms of obeying wage and
hour laws.  But it seems more likely that the growth in such class ac-
tions is a result of a shift in direction by class action lawyers.  That is
certainly the explanation offered by an experienced defense lawyer in
2014:
The FLSA [Fair Labor Standards Act] was enacted in 1938, but
there wasn’t much litigation until about 15 years ago, after which
the number of class action cases just exploded.  In fact, 91 percent of
today’s labor and employment class action suits are wage and hour
related, for a few reasons.  The standard for class certification in an
FLSA matter is much lower compared to other employment law
issues, and the pool of potential class members is significantly
larger.  In harassment cases, for instance, the class is limited to em-
ployees who claim to have been harassed, generally by a particular
supervisor.  Wage and hour class actions challenge a broad pay
practice and can include all employees subject to that practice.126
123. Daniel C. Lopez, Note, Collective Confusion: FLSA Collective Actions, Rule 23 Class
Actions, and the Rules Enabling Act, 61 HAST. L.J. 275, 276 (2009–2010).
124. See, e.g., Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1527 (2013).  But the
Court was careful to distinguish class actions from collective actions asserting claims under the
Fair Labor Standards Act:
[R]espondent relies almost entirely upon cases that arose in the context of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 class actions . . . .  But these cases are inapposite . . . because Rule
23 actions are fundamentally different from collective actions under the FLSA . . . .
Id. at 1529.
125. Stein v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship., 772 F.3d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We agree with the
Symczyk dissent.”).
126. Interview by Editor with Angelo Spinola, Shareholder, Littler Mendelson P.C., in Wage
and Hour Class Actions in the Healthcare Industry: Legal Challenges and E-Discovery Solutions,
METRO. CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2014, at 12, 12 (quoting Angelo Spinola).
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In somewhat the same vein, but a different substantive area, we are
told that “[i]n the wake of the PSLRA, many professional plaintiffs
simply moved into other types of corporate lawsuits.  In shareholder
derivative suits and acquisition class actions across the country, pro-
fessional plaintiffs are back.”127
B. Going to State Court
Although CAFA expanded federal court jurisdiction, it did not put
an end to state-court class actions.128  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s
holding that the Anti-Injunction Act forbade a federal court injunc-
tion against a class action in a West Virginia state court129 demon-
strates that state courts remain an alternative venue.  In late 2013, for
example, an article appeared in the legal press in California entitled
“Wage and Hour Class Actions Are Alive and Well in California.”130
The California courts may even offer a partial refuge from the Su-
preme Court’s pro-arbitration decisions; the state supreme court has
declared that arbitration agreements do not foreclose class actions
under PAGA.131  A defense side lawyer reported that PAGA suits in-
creased by more than 400% between 2005 and 2013 and predicted that
the increase would continue in light of the ruling on arbitration.132
C. Switching to Multidistrict Combination
Class actions are hardly the only method of aggregating litigation in
the United States.  As Professor Sherman observed before Wal-Mart
and Comcast, “increasingly stringent requirements for class certifica-
tion” have “made the MDL model more attractive as a central device
for resolving complex litigation.”133  As Professor Jamie Dodge has
recently reported: “[T]oday, fully one-third of all federal cases are
MDL matters.”134  Creative federal judges have even come to regard
multidistrict litigation as producing what they call a “quasi class ac-
127. Jessica Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder Litigation, 65 FLA. L.
REV. 1089, 1089 (2013) (abstract).
128. See, e.g., supra note 48 and accompanying text. R
129. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2373 (2011).
130. John Zaimes & Noah Stensapir, Wage and Hour Class Actions Are Alive and Well in
California, S.F. DAILY J., Dec. 17, 2013.
131. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A. LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 133 (Cal. 2014).
132. Katherine Bleyker, Courts Use Common Sense To Manage PAGA, S.F. DAILY J., July 16,
2014.
133. Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation If a Class Action
Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2206 (2008).
134. Jaime Dodge, Facilitative Judging: Organizational Design in Mass-Multidistrict Litigation,
64 EMORY L.J. 329, 331 (2014).
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tion.”135  As Professor Mullenix has pointed out, the whole idea of a
“quasi-class action” is dubious,136 but for a lawyer seeking a route to
aggregate litigation, it may seem a godsend.
D. Moving Abroad
As mentioned supra,137 much of the world deplores and fears the
American class action.  But that is not universally true.  Class actions
in Canada and Australia seem not to present some of the challenges
that exist under recent decisions of our Supreme Court.138  And be-
cause Canada is our “near abroad,” it should not be surprising to find
that some American lawyers have begun experimenting with filing
cases in Canada instead of the United States.139
E. Mass Actions
Finally, simple joinder can produce something like a class action, as
CAFA recognized with its introduction of the concept of “mass ac-
tions.”140  These cases can present challenges very similar to class ac-
tions.  For example, a 2011 Ninth Circuit case involved a suit by
approximately 1,000 plaintiffs arising out of the operation of a chrome
plating facility in a California town from 1945 until 1995.141  Faced
with this mass, the district court was persuaded to enter what is called
a Lone Pine order,142 requiring all plaintiffs to submit information
about their alleged exposure to toxic materials and make a prima facie
showing of causation as a condition for continuing with the case.  The
135. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611–12 (E.D. La. 2008)
(citing In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)).
136. Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389,
389–90 (2011).
137. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. R
138. See Vince Morabito, Clashing Classes Down Under—Evaluating Australia’s Competing
Class Actions Through Empirical and Comparative Perspectives, 27 CONN. J. INT’L L. 245, 257
(2012) (“[T]he Federal and Victorian regimes do not employ what are known in the US and
Canada as certification regime.”).
139. Ashby Jones, Lawyers Looking to Canada for Shareholder Litigation, WALL ST. J., Feb.
27, 2012, at B4 (“Unfavorable court rulings and legislation helped damp filings of securities
class-action lawsuits in the U.S., but these suits are starting to gain traction in Canada, prompting
some U.S. lawyers to increasingly look for opportunities up north.”).
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(A) (2012) (“[A] mass action shall be deemed to be a class action
. . . .”).  The statute defines “mass action” as a case in which “monetary relief claims of 100 or
more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve
common questions of law or fact.” Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
141. Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Trust, 633 F.3d 828, 831–32 (9th Cir. 2011).
142. This sort of requirement was seemingly invented originally in Lore v. Lone Pine Corp.,
and has been named after that case.  No. L-33606-85, 1986 WL 637507, at *1–2 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Nov. 18, 1986).
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Ninth Circuit upheld the practice in the case before it, but other courts
have questioned it.143
In sum, the advent of a “public interest bar” over the last forty
years, the flexibility of a variety of procedural measures, and the exis-
tence of multiple forums and forms for aggregate litigation suggest
that it will continue to appear in U.S. courts.  That should not lead one
to minimize the importance of recent decisions curtailing use of the
class action—particularly the mandatory arbitration decisions—but it
does emphasize the relevance of Confucius’ saying that was quoted at
the outset.
V. THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT PUZZLE
For American procedure, there is another dimension in addition to
the impact of the headwinds faced by class-action lawyers—the extent
to which class actions provide valuable private enforcement of public
legal norms.  From a European perspective, this sort of enforcement
consequence may seem alien, although something of the sort may now
be emerging.144  One thing on which both plaintiffs’ and defense law-
yers seem to agree is that the prospect of private class actions does
affect the behavior of potential defendants.  But they disagree fer-
vently on whether that is a desirable thing; from the perspective of
many defendants, as a RAND report noted in 2000, class action prac-
tice “enables large numbers of lawsuits about trivial or nonexistent
violations of statutes and regulations that govern advertising, market-
ing, pricing and other business practices, and about trivial losses to
individual consumers.”145
A recent discussion of current issues in class actions involving Cali-
fornia lawyers from both sides of the aisle illustrates the debate.  The
143. See, e.g., In re Digitek Prod. Liab. Litig., 264 F.R.D. 249, 259 (S.D.W. Va. 2010).
Given [the] choice between a “Lone Pine order” created under the court’s inherent
case management authority and available procedural devices such as summary judg-
ment, motions to dismiss, motions for sanctions and similar rules, I believe it more
prudent to yield to the consistency and safeguards of the mandated rules especially at
this stage of this litigation.  Claims of efficiency, elimination of frivolous claims and
fairness are effectively being addressed using the existing and standard means.  Resort-
ing to crafting and applying a Lone Pine order should only occur where existing proce-
dural devices explicitly at the disposal of the parties by statute and federal rule have
been exhausted or where they cannot accommodate the unique issues of this litigation.
We have not reached that point.
Id.
144. S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class Action
Have a New Analogue?, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899, 953–68 (2012) (discussing European
policies that may encourage something like group litigation enforcement of regulatory norms).
145. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS
FOR PRIVATE GAIN 50 (2000).
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discussion focused in part on what the defense bar often calls “no in-
jury” data breach cases—cases in which there may be a large number
of consumers affected by a data breach but few (if any) who actually
were harmed as a result.  A plaintiff’s lawyer emphasized the enforce-
ment aspect of class actions:
[I]t’s a system where, if there’s not government oversight in a partic-
ular area, plaintiffs lawyers can step in.  I think it’s an important
aspect of what class actions mechanisms are there for, which is to
take something that might otherwise go unchecked and correct it.
The statutory violation cases are a response to the world that we’re
living in, and what technologies have enabled big companies to do
with people’s private information.146
A defense lawyer responded:
Point well taken . . . .  [But where] the statutory remedy isn’t
tethered to actual damage, a class action is not the answer.  This is
where government enforcement plays an important role.  The attor-
ney general’s or district attorney’s office, through its consumer en-
forcement division, can intercede to enforce the law in a way that is
fair.147
So the problem is: How much private enforcement via class actions
is enough?  The almost cartoonish defense reaction sometimes en-
countered is that less is always better, and the competing somewhat
cartoonish plaintiff perspective is that more is always better.  At least
sometimes, legislatures may create private enforcement schemes and
try to calibrate the use of class actions.  The New York legislature, for
example, apparently tried to do that in regard to statutory penalties
only to have the Supreme Court conclude that Rule 23 could not be so
easily abrogated by state law.148  And sometimes private class actions
may seem somewhat to cripple public enforcement.  Recently, for ex-
ample, the Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals held that the prior settle-
ment of a class action on behalf of California consumers barred the
146. 2015 Roundtable Series: Class Action, CAL. LAWYER, June 2015, at 41, 43 (quoting attor-
ney Graham LippSmith of Kasdan LippSmith Weber Turner).
147. Id. at 48–49 (quoting Layne Melzer of Rutan & Tucker).
148. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437–38
(2010) (holding that a New York provision forbidding class actions for suits seeking to recover a
statutory penalty could not prevent class certification under Rule 23).  But Congress can limit
the use of class actions in relation to claims it creates as it sees fit.  A good example is the Truth
in Lending Act, which prompted judges to bridle “ruinous” potential liability in class actions for
small or technical failures to comply with the statute’s disclosure requirements.  Congress even-
tually set a cap for liability in such cases.  See 7B CHARLES WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1804 (3d ed. 2005), for a discussion of
this history.
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California Attorney General from pursuing compensation on a parens
patriae basis (although other remedies remained available).149
The general question as to whether private enforcement should be
encouraged or relied upon has generated an immense amount of liter-
ature.150  Professors Burbank, Farhang, and Kreitzer have recently
enumerated the considerations:
On the positive side of the ledger, relative to administrative im-
plementation, private enforcement regimes can: (1) multiply re-
sources devoted to prosecuting enforcement actions; (2) shift the
costs of regulation off of governmental budgets and onto the private
sector; (3) take advantage of private information to detect viola-
tions; (4) encourage legal and policy innovation; (5) emit a clear and
consistent signal that violations will be prosecuted, providing insur-
ance against the risk that a system of administrative implementation
will be subverted; (6) limit the need for direct and visible interven-
tion by the bureaucracy in the economy and society; and (7) facili-
tate participatory and democratic governance.151
But as they caution, there is also negative potential:
[P]rivate enforcement regimes (1) empower judges, who lack policy
expertise, to make policy; (2) tend to produce inconsistent and con-
tradictory doctrine from courts; (3) weaken the administrative
state’s capacity to articulate a coherent regulatory scheme by pre-
empting administrative rulemaking; (4) usurp prosecutorial discre-
tion; (5) discourage cooperation with regulators and voluntary
compliance; (6) weaken oversight of policy implementation by the
legislative and executive branches; and (7) lack democratic legiti-
macy and accountability.152
American public enforcement is surely more empowered than pri-
vate enforcement, even if private lawyers have the class action availa-
ble to them.  Class actions can be dismissed or settled only with the
court’s approval,153 and the proponents of a settlement bear the bur-
den of showing that judicial approval is warranted by establishing that
it is “fair, reasonable and adequate.”154
But public authorities can act without judicial oversight comparable
to that required in class actions.  For example, the EEOC may seek
class-wide relief without satisfying Rule 23.155  More to the present
149. California v. IntelliGender, LLC, 771 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2014).
150. Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives To Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 782 n.1 (2011)
(referring to the “vast literature” on the choice between public and private enforcement).
151. Burbank et al., supra note 1, at 662. R
152. Id. at 667.
153. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
154. Id. at 23(e)(2).
155. See, e.g., EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc. 774 F.3d 1169, 1179 (8th Cir. 2014) (hold-
ing that Rule 23 does not limit or control the agency’s suit seeking class-wide relief).
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point, however, the general role of public authorities in enforcement
actions differs very significantly from that which applies to private
class actions brought for “enforcement” purposes.  The public authori-
ties can decide to dismiss without getting a judge’s approval like that
required for dismissal of a class action.156  They can similarly agree to
settle their cases for sums not subject to judicial review.
Even if the settlement calls for entry of a judicial decree with in-
junctive provisions, the proper judicial attitude toward this arrange-
ment differs greatly from settled class actions, for the court is to
approve the decree unless it affirmatively finds that entering the de-
cree would harm the public interest.  A proposed Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) settlement of claims against Citigroup
provides an illustration.  The consent decree called for disgorgement
of $160 million plus prejudgment interest of $30 million, a civil penalty
of $95 million, and entry of an injunction permanently enjoining Ci-
tigroup from violating § 17 of the 1933 Securities Act.157  But the dis-
trict judge refused to approve it on the ground that the SEC and
Citigroup did not offer sufficient evidence that the settlement served
the public interest.158
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court’s
refusal constituted an abuse of discretion because the decision mis-
perceived the court’s role in regard to a government enforcement ac-
tion.159  It quoted the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for the
proposition that “[u]nless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or
unreasonable, it ought to be approved”160 and ruled that “[a]bsent a
substantial basis in the record for concluding that the proposed con-
sent decree does not meet these requirements, the district court is re-
quired to enter the order.”161  Besides emphasizing that the burden
rests on the opponents of the proposed SEC settlement rather than on
its proponents, the court held that the entire notion of judicial review
of adequacy was out of place:
156. An example is provided by an antitrust suit the government filed against IBM.  After a
change in administrations, the U.S. Department of Justice reached a settlement calling for volun-
tary dismissal of the suit.  The district judge, however, refused to approve the dismissal.  The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals then granted a writ of mandamus on the ground that the dis-
trict judge had exceeded his jurisdiction. See In re Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 687 F.2d 591, 596–97
(2d Cir. 1982).
157. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 2014).
158. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated,
752 F.3d 285.
159. Citigroup, 752 F.3d at 297.
160. Id. at 294 (first alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th
Cir. 1984)).
161. Id.
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We omit “adequacy” from the standard.  Scrutinizing a proposed
consent decree for “adequacy” appears borrowed from the review
applied to class action settlements, and strikes us as particularly in-
apt in the context of a proposed S.E.C. consent decree.  The ade-
quacy requirement makes perfect sense in the context of a class
action settlement—a class action settlement typically precludes fu-
ture claims, and a court is rightly concerned that the settlement
achieved be adequate.  By the same token, a consent decree does
not pose the same concerns regarding adequacy—if there are poten-
tial plaintiffs with a private right of action, those plaintiffs are free
to bring their own actions.  If there is no private right of action, then
the S.E.C. is the entity charged with representing the victims, and is
politically liable if it fails to adequately perform its duties.162
The judge’s evaluation of the public interest, similarly, did not sup-
port the court’s refusal to approve the decree.  “The job of determin-
ing whether the proposed S.E.C. consent decree best serves the public
interest, however, rests squarely with the S.E.C., and its decision mer-
its significant deference.”163  Accordingly, “[o]n remand, the district
court should consider whether the public interest would be disserved
by entry of the consent decree.”164
One could argue that private attorneys who seek to justify their
class actions as achieving public enforcement in addition to private
compensation should be required to show that public enforcement is
somehow “inadequate.”165  But that is likely not a requirement the
regulators would favor.  And it is worth noting, as Professor Farhang
(and many others) point out, that the orientation of public enforcers
may shift dramatically with the outcome of elections.  Just now, at
least some urge that the public enforcers are overdoing it.  In its Au-
gust 30, 2014 issue, the Economist made its cover story “Criminalising
the American Company,” beginning with the observation that “[i]t is a
rare month that goes by without announcements of big legal settle-
ments by large companies doing business in America.”166  A few
weeks earlier, the same magazine reported that big banks have em-
braced “derisking”—retreating from markets and lines of business—
in “a pre-emptive cringe in the face of American regulation.”167  From
this perspective, the private class action really seems to be piling on.
162. Id. (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 296.
164. Id. at 297.
165. It might be noted that there have been suggestions that “deterrent effect” be added to
Rule 23(b)(3) as an additional factor to consider in regard to class certification.
166. Criminalising the American Company: A Mammoth Guilt Trip, ECONOMIST, Aug.
30–Sept. 4, 2014, at 21, 21.
167. Poor Correspondents, ECONOMIST, June 14, 2014, at 65, 65.
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But other stories in the press remind us of the concerns that cause
people to be uneasy about relying entirely on public enforcement.  In
January 2014, the New York Times ran a story entitled “Wall Street
Chips Away at Dodd-Frank Rules,” with a subtitle referring to “A
Swarm of Lobbyists.”168  Perhaps closer to the point, the former Com-
missioner of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion, in a New York Times op-ed piece published in March 2015,
denounced Governor Chris Christie’s decision to settle a longstanding
environmental clean-up action against Exxon for what he described as
“roughly three cents on the dollar.”169  He noted that the Governor
had been Chairman of the Republican Governors Association in 2014
when Exxon donated $500,000 to that group.170
The private enforcement consequences of class-action treatment
therefore present a puzzle—how to decide when to authorize that
treatment, and when not to authorize it.  At least sometimes, it really
seems that class actions create serious risks of overenforcement.  Pos-
sible examples are proposed class actions seeking statutory damages
from merchants under the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
for failure to recalibrate the machines by which they generate receipts
so only the last four numbers of a credit card number appear on the
receipt.  In a number of cases, judges presented with class claims for
potentially millions of dollars refused to certify them on the ground
that it would not be “superior” to individual litigation (with statutory
recovery of attorney fees).  But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
overturned a similar decision by a district judge who found that the
defendant acted in good faith and should not, therefore, face a liability
between $29 million and $290 million.171  Rule 23 was in the rulebook
when Congress acted, the court reasoned, and the district judge
should not insist on more than the rule required.172
Notwithstanding, another California district judge later refused to
certify a class in a similar suit against the City of Laguna Beach for a
similar alleged deficiency in the machines at the municipal parking lot.
The judge pointed out that the plaintiff did not claim anyone had been
harmed by the inclusion of additional credit card numbers and noted
168. Jonathan Weisman & Eric Lipton, Wall Street Chips Away at Dodd-Frank Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2014, at A1.
169. Bradley M. Campbell, Opinion, Shortchanging New Jersey by Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 2015, at A27.  The settlement was later approved. See Benjamin Weiser, New Jersey’s $225
Million Settlement with Exxon Mobil Is Approved, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 26, 2015, at A15.
170. Campbell, supra note 169.
171. Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 2010); cf. 7B WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 148, § 1776. R
172. Bateman, 623 F.3d at 724.
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that the potential $15 million liability was more than the city’s entire
budget for the police department so that the suit could “severely limit
Laguna Beach’s ability to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the
city.”173  On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
judges upheld the district judge’s decision but on the ground that
membership in the class was not ascertainable because the class did
not include business users of the lot, but there was no way to deter-
mine how many of those there were, and there was also no way to
determine which customers actually got receipts with additional num-
bers on them.174  Plaintiffs’ lawyers then petitioned for certiorari, but
that was denied.175  Frankly, this case sounds like a poster child exam-
ple of overkill by class action.
At present, at least in San Francisco, the most prominent sort of
consumer class action relates to claims made against manufacturers of
food products.  Some (including some judges) even call the federal
court here “Food Court.”176  Given the preponderance of “foodies”
hereabouts, that makes sense; with a “universal venue” class action
that could be filed anywhere, wouldn’t it make sense to file it in San
Francisco where a local jury would likely be comprised of people at-
tuned to concerns about food purity and safety?  Add to that the
broad consumer protection laws that exist in California, and the lure
must be almost irresistible.
The general theme of these suits is that a producer of food products
says things in advertising that the plaintiff claims are misleading or
false.  A favorite target is the assertion that the product is “all natu-
ral.”177  But as a recent article about bringing such cases in the
monthly magazine published by the largest plaintiffs’ lawyer associa-
tion warns, “class certification may be hampered by the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend.”178  Perhaps this is just
173. Rowden v. Pac. Parking Sys., Inc., 282 F.R.D. 581, 587 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
174. Martin v. Pac. Parking Sys., Inc., 583 F. App’x. 803, 804 (9th Cir. 2014).
175. Martin v. Pac. Parking Sys., Inc. 135 S. Ct. 962 (2015) (mem.).
176. See, e.g., Anthony J. Anscombe & Mary Elizabeth Buckley, BNA Insight: Is the ‘Food
Court’ Losing Steam?  An Update on Food and Beverage Consumer Class Actions in the North-
ern District of California, 15 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA) 776, 776 (2014); Vanessa Bloom,
Welcome to the Food Court, S.F. RECORDER, Mar. 1, 2013.
177. See Douglas McNamara & Liela Aminpour, When ‘All Natural’ Is Anything But, TRIAL,
Nov. 2014, at 22, for a discussion.  This article begins as follows:
Food-mislabeling lawsuits have become more common over the past several years.
Consumers concerned with eating healthy are looking for nutritious products made
with natural ingredients.  Food manufacturers are trying to cash in on this sentiment
and advertise their products as “all natural”—sometimes even when they are not.
Id. at 23. See also Label Litigation, CAL. LAW., Jan. 2015 (referring to “food court”).
178. Id.
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another instance of Supreme Court impediments to private enforce-
ment of legal protections for the public.
Or perhaps there is more to it.  Consider whether misstatements on
food advertisements never existed before the last few years.  I recall
being bombarded with television advertisements when I was a kid that
said something like: “Wonder Bread helps build strong bodies 12
ways.”  Maybe that was really true.  I wonder whether overstatements
or misstatements to sell food products just started a few years ago or
got much worse a few years ago.  It seems to me that the burst of
litigation of this sort can be explained more easily by Confucius’ say-
ing—lawyers looking to file class actions typically hit on this category.
And then they hit on San Francisco as the place to file them.
False advertising is surely a legitimate target of legal action.  In-
deed, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) seems to be equipped to
deal with this problem.  Like other enforcement agencies, however, it
may be unable to do as much enforcing as would be desirable.  So
having class actions pick up the slack could be beneficial to all (except
the purveyors of mislabeled food products).
But there are some valid reasons to pause on the way to class certi-
fication.  A prime example would seem to be defining the class.  Con-
sider a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision involving the claim
that although the Coca Cola Company advertised that all Diet Coke
was made with aspartame, some Diet Coke sold in soda fountains (as
opposed to grocery stores) was partly sweetened with saccharin.179
Plaintiffs filed a class action asserting a claim under the Illinois Con-
sumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act (ICFA).180  One serious
problem with the case was determining who had bought Diet Coke in
soda fountains.  Even if that could be solved, other questions
remained:
Membership in Oshana’s proposed class required only the
purchase of a fountain Diet Coke from March 12, 1999, forward.
Such a class could include millions who were not deceived and thus
have no grievance under the ICFA.  Some people may have bought
fountain Diet Coke because it contained saccharin, and some people
may have bought fountain Diet Coke even though it had
saccharin.181
To put it mildly, a class action on behalf of all purchasers of the
product is a blunt instrument for enforcing public norms against mis-
179. Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co. 472 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 2006).
180. Id. The statute is now called the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Prac-
tices Act.  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/1–505/12 (2007).
181. Oshana, 472 F.3d at 514.
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leading advertisements, and these cases might more easily be charac-
terized as extracting tribute (and attorney fee awards) from producers
for what many would likely call minor misconduct.  For an example,
consider a recent case involving Kellogg’s Frosted Mini-Wheats.  At
some point, Kellogg began to claim in advertisements that the product
was scientifically proven to improve children’s cognitive functions for
several hours after breakfast.182  The message seemed to be: As a
good parent, you should load little Johnny up on sugar before he goes
to school so he will get into the Ivy League.  This led to a class action
on behalf of purchasers.  But presumably the product had existed
before the advertising campaign; how does one determine which pur-
chasers bought the cereal because they were persuaded by the
campaign?
One way of looking at this issue is to compare it to the fraud-on-
the-market theory that was recently retained by the Supreme
Court.183  That doctrine makes proof of individual reliance unimpor-
tant in securities fraud class actions.  Maybe the same thing should be
true with the Mini-Wheats.  Perhaps if there were a big spike in
purchases of the product after the advertisements appeared, such a
conclusion could be supported (although it would seem that at least
some purchasers were repeat customers).  And the nature of the com-
pensable harm might also be debated: assuming many would buy
sugar coated breakfast food for kids (recall Tony the Tiger and Kel-
logg’s Frosted Flakes), it would seem that purchasers got some value
for their purchases even if the food did not ease the way for Johnny to
get into the Ivy League.
In the Kellogg’s case, the eventual outcome seems not to have been
a major success for private enforcement of public norms against de-
ceptive advertisements.  In a settlement approved by the district court,
Kellogg agreed to establish a $2.75 million fund to compensate pur-
chasers with $5.00 per box purchased, to a maximum of three (i.e.,
$15.00).  It also agreed to distribute $5.5 million worth of specified
Kellogg’s food items to “charities that feed the indigent”184 and to
refrain for three years from claiming that “eating a bowl of . . . Frosted
Mini-Wheats cereal for breakfast is clinically shown to improve atten-
tiveness by nearly 20%.”185 But it would be able to claim that
“[c]linical studies have shown that kids who eat a filling breakfast like
182. Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2012).
183. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text. R
184. Dennis, 697 F.3d at 863.
185. Id. (quoting Dennis v. Kellogg Co., No. 09-CV-1786-IEG(WMc), 2010 WL 4285011, at *1
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010)).
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Frosted Mini-Wheats have an 11% better attentiveness in school than
kids who skip breakfast.”186  Last, but not least, Kellogg agreed to pay
class counsel up to $2 million for bringing the suit.187
This is not to say that all class actions claiming food products have
been misleadingly advertised are similar to the Kellogg’s suit.  And
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned approval of the settle-
ment in that case on the ground that the cy pres feature involving
feeding the indigent could not be justified in a suit on behalf of par-
ents seeking to get their kids into the Ivy League.188  But it does un-
derscore grounds for uneasiness with a wholehearted embrace of the
idea that class actions are a critical, or perhaps desirable, way to
achieve private enforcement.  And cases like the Kellogg’s suit could
easily support arguments that class actions actually do nothing more
than the critics claim—enrich the lawyers.
If one looks around for legal doctrine that might express the uneasi-
ness that attends such criticisms, one need not look to the Supreme
Court.  Instead, one could look to the American Law Institute (ALI).
ALI’s Principles of Aggregate Litigation directly address concerns
about misuse of cy pres arrangements and argue that these arrange-
ments should only be used as a last resort.189  Courts have begun to
cite and adopt the ALI’s formulation.190  Another topic on which
seemingly responsive doctrine has emerged is “ascertainability.”  In
Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,191 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
a class action based on the claimed health benefits of an inexpensive
over-the-counter product on the ground that members in the class
were not “ascertainable.”  It also suggested that it would not suffice to
credit a class member’s affidavit as sufficient proof of purchase of the
product (putting the question of being misled somewhat to the
side).192
Carrera prompted an aggressive response from a district judge in
California:
Carrera eviscerates low purchase price consumer class actions in the
Third Circuit.  It appears that pursuant to Carrera in any case where
the consumer does not have a verifiable record of its purchase, such
as a receipt, and the manufacturer or seller does not keep a record
of buyers, Carrera prohibits certification of the class.  While this
186. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Dennis, 2010 WL 4285011, at *1).
187. Id. (quoting Dennis, 2010 WL 4285011, at *1).
188. Id. at 861.
189. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
190. See, e.g., In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 775 F.3d 1060, 1063 (8th Cir. 2015).
191. 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
192. See id. at 304–10.
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may be the law of the Third Circuit, it is not currently the law of the
Ninth Circuit.193
Judge Posner, meanwhile, has demurred to the idea that a sworn state-
ment should not be sufficient,194 and the Seventh Circuit has rejected
a “heightened” ascertainability requirement195
So ascertainability may also be a blunt instrument.  But it may also
be an understandable method for constraining private overenforce-
ment.  Consider, for example, the class action about a decade and a
half ago against McDonald’s on behalf of Hindu purchasers of french
fries that McDonald’s claimed were made only from vegetable prod-
ucts but actually contained beef flavoring.  It may be difficult to re-
gard those who eat McDonald’s french fries as seeking healthy food,
but the offense to Hindus could hardly be overstated.196  Perhaps a
public authority would not properly pursue this “minority” concern,
but fashioning a class definition and a class-wide remedy surely
presented great challenges for the courts.  And it is difficult to con-
ceive that those who embrace the Golden Age vision of class actions
had quite this use of the device in mind, much less that the framers of
the modern class action conceived of it in 1962–1964 when Rule 23
was being rewritten.
So the private enforcement consideration—while surely impor-
tant—is also something of a puzzle in fashioning class-action doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION: WILL THE WIND SHIFT?
I began by recognizing that proponents of class actions were facing
something of a headwind due to some recent Supreme Court deci-
sions.  But since 1966, most of the legal development that has shaped
class actions has come not from the Supreme Court but from the
lower federal courts.  And the attitudes of those courts can change.
193. McCray v. Elations Co., No. EDCV 13–00242 JGB (OPx), 2014 WL 1779243, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 13, 2014).  It might be worth noting that California has a special statute authorizing,
indeed requiring, cy pres treatment of residual funds left over after claims are satisfied in a class
action. CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 384 (West 2004).  In addition, the California state courts pioneered
the concept of providing such remedies in class actions. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433
P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967) (upholding a class-action remedy involving the requirement that the cab
company lower its fares in a future period as a remedy for overcharges in a past period).
194. “One would have thought, given the low ceiling on the amount of money that a member
of the class could claim, that a sworn statement would be sufficient documentation, without
requiring receipts or other business records likely to have been discarded.”  Pearson v. NBTY,
Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 2014).
195. Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015) (addressing the question
of “whether Rule 23(b)(3) imposes a heightened ‘ascertainability’ requirement as the Third Cir-
cuit and some district courts have held recently” and rejecting that idea).
196. See Laurie Goodsetin, For Hindus and Vegetarians, Surprise in McDonald’s Fries, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2001, at 1.
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Judge Posner might be an illustration.  For some time, he was proba-
bly regarded as antagonistic to class actions.  Indeed, in the wake of
CAFA, Federal Judicial Center researchers found that plaintiffs’ law-
yers had seemingly flocked to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and
avoided the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, due perhaps to its
then-perceived resistance to class actions.197  Yet more recently Judge
Posner has recognized that the class action “is an ingenious procedural
innovation,”198 and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals seems to
have become considerably more receptive to class certification.199  At
least some winds can shift.
At the same time, winds originally perceived as helpful only to one
side may turn out to have more bipartisan effects.  Recall the question
of “merits scrutiny” at the class certification stage.200  That was ini-
tially regarded as an entirely defense-friendly development.  But it has
not turned out to be.  Again a decision by Judge Posner can be an
example.  In a proposed class action on behalf of those who faced suits
for consumer billings filed after the limitations period had expired, the
defense argued that, because there was a debate about whether the
limitations period was four years or five years, the class representative
(who was sued after five years) was inadequate and atypical because
she had no personal stake in proving the limitations period was really
four years rather than five in order to press the claims of other class
members.201  The defendant persuaded the district judge to deny certi-
fication on the ground that the limitations issue went to the merits and
was therefore off limits at the certification stage.202  But the court of
appeals ruled that the limitations question was nevertheless open for
decision because it was pertinent to class certification and further held
197. See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act
on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723,
1759 fig.6 (2008).
198. Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2014).
199. For example, in Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., the court overturned denial of certifica-
tion in a suit brought on behalf of a class of purchasers of defendant’s coffee pods.  764 F.3d 750,
752 (7th Cir. 2014).  Though defendant’s advertisements suggested that the pods contained
ground coffee, in fact they were filled with 95% instant coffee. Id. at 753.  Consumer surveys
showed that purchasers did not realize the pods actually contained instant coffee. Id.  Defendant
resisted class certification on the ground that there was no way to define the class of purchasers
who were misled, and the district judge was persuaded.  But the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals was not.  “If the court thought that no class can be certified until proof exists that every
member has been harmed, it was wrong.” Id. at 757.  Moreover, commonality was satisfied, the
appellate court ruled, by the dominant issue of whether the product was misrepresented: “a rule
requiring 100% commonality would eviscerate consumer-fraud class actions.” Id. at 759.
200. See supra notes 93–112 and accompanying text. R
201. Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1080 (7th Cir. 2013).
202. Id. at 1081.
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that the proper limitations period was four years, leading to reversal
of the district judge’s denial of certification.203
And the class action is not a device that only individual plaintiffs
can use, or one that can only be used against alleged corporate wrong-
doers.  Consider a report about nine class actions filed by Farmers
Insurance Group “against nearly 200 communities in the Chicago
area,” arguing that these local governments should have done more to
“fortify their sewers and stormwater drains” against increased rainfall
accompanying climate change (thereby, presumably, avoiding or limit-
ing harm to the homes of Farmers’ insureds in the area).204  A climate
change specialist at Columbia Law School was quoted as predicting
that: “[W]e will see more and more cases.”205
So change continues to happen, and the wind may shift again.  One
might ask: From what quarter would we like the change to come?
One source would be Congress; as the PSLRA and CAFA show, Con-
gress can make changes that bear importantly on class certification, at
least on specific subjects.  Another would be the Supreme Court; as
indicated above, the wind from that quarter has probably been a
headwind more frequently than a tailwind for proponents of class-ac-
tion litigation, although the direction likely has a good deal to do with
the merits of individual cases.  And the Court continues to take class-
action cases that could have important effects.206  Yet another might
be the lower courts, who decide far more class-certification cases than
the Supreme Court and have probably been the main source of class-
action law since 1966.  On that score, we might take heed of some-
thing Judge Posner said more than twenty-five years ago in another
class-action case:
The ease and speed with which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
can be amended by those whom Congress entrusted with the re-
203. Id. at 1081–82.  Along the way, the district court judge displayed a clear appreciation of
the actual dynamics of class-action litigation.  Thus, he questioned arguments that the named
plaintiff might not be an adequate representative due to the limitations issue because that argu-
ment is “unrealistic about the role of the class representative in a class action suit.” Id. at 1080.
Instead, he observed, class counsel are the real principals in such cases. Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM
RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:52 (5th ed. 2011)).
204. See Mica Rosenberg, Insurer’s Climate Change Class Actions: More To Come?, INS. J.,
May 19, 2014, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/05/19/329506.htm.
205. Id. (quoting Michael Gerrard, Director of the Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia
Law School, New York).
206. Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiffs’
collective action adequately showed that common questions applied to their claims for extra pay
for the time spent donning and doffing protective clothing), aff’d, No. 14-1146, 2016 WL 1092414
(Mar. 22, 2016); Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the
failure of a proposed class representative to accept an offer of judgment made pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 68 did not moot his case), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).
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sponsibility for doing so should make federal judges hesitate to cre-
ate new forms of judicial proceeding in the teeth of the existing
rules.207
So that leaves the rules process.  As Professors Burbank and
Farhang have noted, the rules process has become “sticky” and less
likely to produce dramatic changes in rules.208  But the Advisory
Committee has again turned its attention to Rule 23 and formed a
Rule 23 Subcommittee, which has identified several topics as initial
subjects of discussion.209  The Subcommittee remains open to input on
the issues it has identified and to suggestions about additional topics
for possible rule change.210  Whether the rules process will produce
rule changes is presently a very open question, and the question what
changes might emerge is even more open.  But there is one prediction
that seems justified—class action lawyers and federal judges will con-
tinue to bend in the breeze.  Thus, the April 2015 issue of Trial Maga-
zine reports that “dozens” of class actions have recently been filed due
to allegedly toxic wood flooring and that plaintiffs’ lawyers who filed
those cases have petitioned the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion for centralization of the cases.211  And, a March 2016 CLI Inter-
national program on “Food Law” in Washington, D.C., featured two
panels on class actions.212  In predicting aggregate litigation would
continue, Arthur Miller was right.213
207. Henson v. E. Lincoln Twp., 814 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1987).
208. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Re-
form: An Institutional Approach 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1590 (2015).
209. Those interested in these topics could review the agenda memo for the November 2015
meeting of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which can be found through the Administra-
tive Office’s website, www.uscourts.gov.  The memo is at pp. 87–133 of the agenda book.
210. On that score, one might consult the Civil Rules Advisory Committee “inbox,” the sug-
gestions for rule change sent to the Committee.  In 2015, quite a few proposals have been made,
and they are posted online at www.uscourts.gov.
211. Alyssa E. Lambert, Dozens of Class Actions Filed over Potentially Toxic Wood Flooring,
AM. ASSOC. FOR JUST. (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.justice.org/news/law-reporter-and-trial-news/
april-2-2015-trial-news.
212. See CLE Int’l, Food Law: Understanding This Rapidly Evolving Area of the Law (2016).
See Label Litigation, supra note 177, for a report that food labeling cases had “usher[ed] in a
new practice area.”
213. Miller, supra note 4, at 306. R
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